ABSTRACT
Efforts to secure key economic infrastructures from cyber-terrorism are not considered to be encouraging in the practitioner literature (Greenemeier, 2004 , Petersen, 2004 , Hunter & Mogull, 2003 & Sarkar, 2004 . Studies indicate higher incidents of software flaws that have enabled increased hacker attacks and infrastructure downtime in 2004. These flaws have cost the economy almost $60 billion , page 54). Cyber-security is indicated to be costly and difficult to deploy, due to evolving technologies, and to be deficient in half of industry having not intrusion-prevention systems but mere intrusion-detection tools (Hulme, 2004, page 86) . Government is noted to be negligent in not formulating integrated government and industry security strategy , page 26 & Verton, 2004) . Studies of the Meta Group indicate in an adapted Figure 1 that few firms in industry have excellent security strategy, irrespective of government. Given increased sophistication in threats and issues in implementing systems, further efforts in improving security strategy are important in defending the technological infrastructures of the country. In launching the War on Terrorism in 2001, President Bush cited multidimensional efforts in defending the country (Roberto & Carioggia, 2002) . Inclusion of security education from academia is important, but is not a frequently heralded initiative in this war (Berinato, 2003) . Institutions have diverse engineering, information systems and computer science curriculum models integrating security education. These models may not be effective in a current cyber-terrorist security strategy. Programs often furnish more broad, core and theoretical learning and less practical, specific and time-to-exploit experience that links the learning to the external environment of security (Evans, 2003, page 6) . Other limitations can include internal faculty not familiar with best government and industry practices in security strategy (Evans, 2003, page 12) , out-of-date programs technologically (Bennett, 2004) , and slowness in updating the programs (Evans, 2003 , page 169). Table 1 below: The criteria defined by the National Security Agency to evaluate the depth and maturity of curricula in information assurance in institutions is in Table 2 below: These criteria were included in the study by the authors, in order to evaluate interactions with governmental and industrial institutions in a potential security strategy.
Institutions designated as Centers of Academic Excellence are required to be current in security education, and if current are re-designated Centers of Excellence in the third academic year. The National Security Agency evaluates its criteria to be current each year. Clearly, security education designed from criteria of the Center of Academic Excellence in Information Assurance program is a helpful, if not critical, component in fighting cyberterrorism. (Lightfoot, 1999 , Maglitta, 1996 & Lee, Trauth & Farwell, 1995 in improving curriculum models important to industry. These studies indicate the importance of industry in helping institutions to update models (Srinivasan, Guan & Wright, 1999) , though only a small number of institutions appear to be implementing immediate improvements in security education. The perception may be that non-Centers of Academic Excellence are not fully cognizant of the cyber-terror threat.
The reality is that academic institutions that include computer science, engineering and information systems schools are affected by an evolution in the field security education. Computer science and information systems are impacted by a new definition of information assurance, as both a technology and a process management discipline (Kahan, 2004) . The evolving frame of reference of specific security skills needed by industry and government in a counter cyber-terrorism strategy is new to these departments. Practitioner studies indicate that non-Center of Academic Excellence institutions are implementing new education and skill models (Thurrott, 2004) , but the models are frequently that of including a few courses in information security (Whitman & Mattord, 2004) , not that of improving curriculum programs (Kahan, 2004) . Such limited models can benefit from Center of Academic Excellence in Information Assurance standardization.
Issues in the limitations of current non-Center of Academic Excellence models of institutions may be in factors that hinder compliance to Center of Excellence standards. Studies indicate the difficulty of faculty not having knowledge requirements in information security in initiating a Center of Excellence model (Kahan, 2004) . Other issues may be in a need for funding, and for further guidance, by the National Security Agency in helping non-Center of Excellence institutions, or in a possible need for flexibility in the Center criteria and NSTISSC standards. Study of the failure of non-Center of Excellence institutions in specific Excellence requirements may enable improvement in the security education strategy of these institutions and subsequent initiative in the Center of Excellence program. Educational systems that cultivate the specific requirements of information security increase the likelihood that students will have the skills to confront cyber-terrorism (Irvine, Chin & Frincke, 1998) .
FOCUS OF PRELIMINARY STUDY
The focus of the study is to explore the importance of to 150 graduate and post-graduate. The study included private and public institutions in two stages of analysis.
In stage 1 of the study, a sample of 56 non-Center of Excellence ABET institutions were identified by the authors, in January -March 2004, based on the reputations of the schools as advanced in technology curricula. The content of catalog and descriptive information of undergraduate, graduate, and post-graduate curricula, furnished by technology and non-technology departments of the institutions, was analyzed for inclusion of security education and environment features. Course descriptions, not titles, were analyzed in the stage. Information on the Internet sites of the schools was additionally evaluated in this stage. Other practitioner literature on the institutions, in publications such as U.S. News and World Report, was evaluated for indication of security education.
In stage 2 of this study, 44 out of the 56 non-Center of Excellence ABET institutions in stage 1 responded to a survey by the authors, in April -October 2004, on conformance of security education and environment features to Center of Academic Excellence criteria. The institutions in this stage are confidentially indicated by state in Table 3 below. An average of three Deans, Associate or Assistant Deans, Chairs, or full time professors in the computer science, engineering or information systems schools, in each of the institutions, were surveyed independently and individually on the telephone by one of the authors. Surveys averaged one to three hours per respondent and were based on a checklist instrument of 41 Information Assurance criteria categories indicated in Table 2 of this study. The content of the instrument was checked prior to the survey by an academic non-author who has expertise in Center of Excellence certification and security education. (The checklist instrument is available upon request of the principal author.) During stage 2, the authors confirmed conformance or non-conformance of Information Assurance in courses, modules in courses, and content in courses. They evaluated, where feasible, courses in the technology and non-technology curricula and programs of the institutions from selected syllabi and the survey. They further evaluated, where feasible, non-conformance or conformance to elements of NSTISSI 4011 -4015 standards. To the category responses of the survey, the authors applied a simple 7-point rating scale from 6 -very high conformance to 0 -no conformance to Center of Excellence criteria, though not actual Excellence maximum or minimum numeric values due to the complexity of a more detailed evaluation. The quantitative data was exported by category to Excel, scored statistically in SPSS 11.5 by Excellence criteria in Table 2 , and summarized by criteria by the authors. 
ANALYSIS
The analysis of the results of the survey disclosed low scores in all of the sampled institutions. Of the 44 institutions, only 13 had mean scores higher than 1.0 (very low conformance of Information Assurance). The analysis in Table 4 As for generic comments, most of these institutions (37 / 44 schools) indicated low concern about Center of Excellence designation currently. Some (19) however indicated the eventual importance of Information Assurance in their curricula and environmental life. Some (11) have introduced Information Assurance in business schools. This latter focus, in beginning to conform to National Security Agency standards, is impacted by frequently indicated issues of other priorities (8) and resources (24) : "We have no current resources to offer these courses"-Dean, Information Systems, Maryland Institution, 2004. Other issues included shifting of educational strategies that precluded review of Information Assurance by the schools at the time of the study (6) .
As for specific comments, the institutions continued to have indication in Table 4 of efforts to enhance their Information Assurance curricula in multi-disciplinary science (92.5 score), encouraged practice (80.3), education partnership (76.0), encouraged research (54.0), and resources (52.0). Basic principles of Information Assurance, and project requirements and research, were included in modules of technology and non-technology courses. Evidence of faculty practice and research (18.7), and of marketing of limited Information Assurance programs and workshops in diverse media (40.0), was sometimes indicated in the study. Nevertheless, the more critical Excellence determinants, of declared concentrations (0.0), declared center (0.0) and full time Information Assurance faculty (10.8), were discouragingly not in conformance in elements of NSTISSC standards, though not unanticipated by the authors. Interactions of the institutions with industrial and governmental institutions was also low in other partnerships (9.8) and other (6.7), with few of the institutions (11 schools) having records of graduated students in security related positions.
Encouraging from the results is that, irrespective of issues, the institutions that are more business focused (29 schools) and less liberal arts (15) in their curricula charters, and have mean scores higher than 1.5 (7), were indicated to be focused on becoming Centers of Excellence by 2008 or earlier. These institutions were indicated to be less public (1) and more private (6) schools, an indication highlighted in the Department of Commerce Study (Evans, 2003 , page 79) that private schools are more flexible in modifying curriculum programs. For the latter institutions, Center of Excellence is a defined goal in their charters.
Further review of these results is needed in selected case studies, which will be finalized in mid-2005. (Fisher, 2002) The conflict between the conservatism of academic institutions and the demand of society for an effective security strategy is an important implication of this study. Non-Center of Academic Excellence information systems and computer science schools having curricula on principles of security, and not best practice applications relating to professional paths and skills (Spaford, 1998) (Squire, 2003) . Though institutions can be cognizant of this disadvantage (Roosevelt, 2005) , efforts in enhancing curricula and programs are not considered fast enough .
The importance of creativity, fastness and flexibility in improving security education strategy is another implementation. Encouraging are internal initiatives, that include the Carnegie Mellon CyLab (Lindquist, 2004 ) and the Center for Information Assurance and Security (CIAS) at the University of Texas (Kelly, 2005) , in implementing new security practices and technologies. External initiatives, that include Georgetown University, Northeastern University and the University of Pennsylvania, in innovating in information sharing and new security programs aligned with the International Security Management Association (ISMA) and AIS International, are helpful in models of security education strategy (Carr, 2004, page 13) . Programs that include security executives in forums, such as the Information Technology Association of America (ITAA) and Business Software Alliance (BSA) (Fisher, 2003) , and security professionals on faculty, can be helpful in improving education in Center of Academic Excellence criteria. Other informal programs that include faculty enhancing the education in consultation with chief security officers, and having students interface with security and business professionals in internships, can be helpful in academic institutions (Grimaila, 2004) . Research centers initiated by academia (Ragatz, 2004) in conjunction with government and industry can enhance programs.
Further implications of the study include the importance of funding for flexible security education strategy. Investment in infrastructure security strategy is frequently limited in government and industry, due to economic constraints. Government incentives to academia in instruction, learning and research in new security practices and tools, and in securing hardware and software technologies, are however important in helping institutions conform to Center of Academic Excellence criteria (Berghel, 2003) . Given the high criteria to be Centers of Excellence, the Department of Defense, the National Cyber-Security Division of the Department of Homeland Security, and / or the National Security Agency, could extend funding to financially limited non-Center of Excellence institutions, if they demonstrate efforts in improving security curricula and programs. Non-Center of Excellence information systems and computer science schools cannot be in isolation in the National Strategy to Secure Cyber-Space.
Implications include the continued limited education of information systems and computer science graduates for positions as skilled security specialists. Though the number of students in technology programs is lower in 2005 than in prior periods, non-Center of Academic Excellence institutions have in general not integrated Information Assurance in their curricula and programs in a differentiating and innovative manner. Initiatives of technology firms, such as CISCO (Grimaila, 2004) , the new IBM Academic Initiative (King, 2004) , Intel, Microsoft and Sun, can be helpful to institutions in integrating security technologies. Internships of information systems and computer science students in security positions in industry and government can also be marketable and timely (Mullin, 2004) . The projections of a higher number of information technology positions, necessitated by government and industry through 2012 (Datz, 2004 , page 58), includes security specialists (Gross, 2005 ) that have to be educated initially by academic institutions.
The final implication of the study is the need for non-Center of Academic Excellence information systems and computer science schools to plan for security education that is sensitive to society. Strategy has to consist of expanded military, government, health and other industry initiatives, as numerous infrastructure systems and technologies impact security in our society (Stahl, 2004) . Security specialists in industry have to be immersed more in mitigating not internal application threats (Vijayan, 2004) , but external infrastructure threats. Security education that is holistically included in both non-technology and technology disciplines is an effective enabler of a security strategy in society (McCreary, 2004) . Such enabling implies further initiative is needed in non-Center of Excellence schools, and potentially from accreditation boards, such as ABET, in helping industry and government in an integrated security strategy that protects society.
LIMITATIONS AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR RESEARCH
The study introduced a framework for researching security education, as the small sample size of academic institutions in the Northeast Corridor furnished a limited basis for generalization to the population of ABET institutions in the country. The study included momentary investigations of several specific schools. The impact of these investigations, in a short time, may have limited significance and thoroughness, so that the implications of this study have to be filtered by the researcher. Further time in academic institutions, and in governmental and industrial organizations, planned by the authors in 2005, may improve future studies. Though this study focused on failure factors in Center of Academic Excellence criteria, a total study of the evolving field of security education strategy will have to include success factors.
CONCLUSION
This study of security education, in the initial sample of institutions in the Northeast Corridor, is insightful in factors inhibiting Center of Excellence in Information Assurance designation. Creativity and flexibility in the implementation of curricula and programs are important in enabling conformance to Center of Excellence standards. Government and industry help is also important in facilitating faster implementation of proactive programs. Further and broader research in the topic is needed in academic institutions throughout the country. The study furnishes a framework for continued research in education as a transformational force in security strategy.
